compared with easier ones, lead to greater effort and commitment, which in turn result in better performance.
With the framework of conscious goal pursuit, another important regu lator is self-efficacy, or one's beliefs about persona! skills and efficacy (Schwarzer, 1992) . For Bandura (1994) , self-efficacy is a key factor concern ing goal setting and goal selection, as well as for effort and persistence on task, influencing the goal-pursuit process from goal selection to attainment, including self-regulation of behavior. In the framework of their work-motiva tion model, Locke and Latham (2004) hypothesized that self-efficacy moder ates goal difficulty and affects performance through effects on direction, ef fort, persistence, and task strategies. Specifically, in comparison with people with low self-efficacy, people with high self-efficacy are more committed to assigned goals, find and use better strategies to attain goals, and respond more positively to negative feedback (Locke & Latham, 1990 Bandura & Locke, 2003) . Goal Setting Theory (e.g., Locke & Latham, 1990) and So cial Cognitive Theory (e.g., Bandura, 1994) are rooted in an agentic perspec tive, focusing on intentional and deliberate processes. In that perspective, people not only plan actions but also consciously motivate their efforts antici patorily.
In most models, goal pursuit is considered a voluntary and consciously controlled activity, although goal pursuit can also occur outside of aware ness, intent, and control (Bargh, 1990; Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar, & Trotschel, 2001; Chartrand & Bargh, 2002; Shah & Kruglanski, 2002; Shah, 2003 ) . According to this view, goals can be triggered volitionally but also automatically. It is well demonstrated that knowledge structures such as schemas, stereotypes, or traits are stored in memory and can be activated automatically and influence behavior and judgment (for a review, see Bargh & Chartrand, 1999) . Goals, as knowledge structures, also can automatically activate. Once activated, either consciously or nonconsciously, a goal operates and guides behavior until goal comple tion. Nonconscious goal activation is generally manipulated through the acti vation of goal-related words or concepts. Thus, for instance, priming words such as "succeed, win, compete" may activate the goal of good performance (Bargh, et al., 2001) . Interestingly, it has been demonstrated that noncon sciously activated goals and consciously pursued goals led to comparable out comes. For instance, nonconsciously activated goals of memorization or im pression formation produced the same effects as explicit instructions (Char trand & Bargh, 1996) . Moreover, Bargh, et al. (2001) demonstrated that non conscious and conscious goals share the same main characteristics: persis tence facing obstacles, resumption after interruption, and increase in intensity up to completion.
A growing number of studies demonstrated that nonconscious goals influence a broad range of behaviors: judgment and interpersonal relation ships (Fitzsimons & Bargh, 2003 ) , anagram resolution or production (Shah & Kruglanski, 2002) , recall and recognition performance (Chartrand & Bargh, 1996; Mitchell, Macrae, Schooler, Rawe, & Milne, 2002) , and voice intensity (Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2003) . As in the case of stereotype priming (e.g., Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg, 1998; Dijksterhuis, 2004; Follenfant, Légal, Dit-Dinard, & Meyer, 2005) , goal priming can increase or decrease performances as a fonction of its content (Légal, Meyer, & Delouvée, 2007) .
If goal-priming effects on behavior are clearly demonstrated, much re mains to be discovered concerning the way nonconscious and conscious goals are related (Bargh, 2006) . Particularly, the question of joint conscious and nonconscious regulations of behavior remains unresolved. Another important and unresolved issue concerns competition between nonconscious and con scious goals. How do conscious and nonconscious goal influences combine? Is there a selection process making one of these "win"? Are nonconscious effects eliminated or do they continue to affect behavior? Does priming com patible with one's current conscious goal improve performance? Inversely, does goal-incompatible priming lead to a decrease in performance?
Nonconscious goal priming (e.g., Bargh, et al., 2001) and conscious goal pursuit (e.g., Locke & Latham, 1990 were explored. Particularly, the question of the joint effect of goal priming and self-efficacy was addressed. If the relation between conscious goal and self-efficacy is largely discussed (e.g., Locke & Latham, 2004) , the relation between nonconscious goal and self-efficacy remains unexplored. Given that self-regulation is a conscious process, the effects of goal priming and self-efficacy could be independent. Inversely, processes triggered by the priming manipulation, as they are non conscious, could be unaffected by self-efficacy, supposedly a conscious and self-reflective process. So, one may expect a main effect of goal-related prim ing as well as a main effect of self-efficacy on performance. Also explored was the idea of compatibility between the nonconsciously primed content and task instruction (i.e., conscious goal). Specifically, priming manipulation involved a content that was compatible or not in regard with the conscious goal's instructions.
In the study, participants performed a drawing task in which they had to pursue a conscious accuracy goal assigned through written instructions. Before they performed the task, they were primed with accuracy-related words (compatible condition), inaccuracy-related words (incompatible condi tion), or received no priming (control condition). In the case of compatibil ity between primed content and consciously held goals, performance was ex pected to be optimal. Conversely, when primed content and conscious goals were not compatible, performance should be lower. So, compared with a no priming condition, performance should be better in the case of compatibility between primed content and conscious goal and worse if these are incom patible. According to the literature about self-efficacy and conscious goal pursuit, better performance of the task was also expected in people with high rather than low self-efficacy. Finally, the best performance should be obtained by participants primed with accuracy-related words and having high self-efficacy. Conversely, the worst performance should be observed in the case of inaccuracy-related priming and of low self-efficacy.
METHOD

Participants and Design
Sixty-seven right-handed undergraduate female students of the Univer sity of Reims participated in the experiment. They received no course credit or monetary reward for participation. Following a median-split procedure, participants were distributed in the conditions as a fonction of score (high vs low) on the drawing Self-efficacy scale (Mdn = 29; Mm g h = 31.73, SDm g h = 2.77 and ML ow = 24.90, SDL ow = 2.70). The design was a 3 (priming: inaccu racy, no prime, accuracy) by 2 (self-efficacy: low vs high) between-subjects design.
Materials and Measures
Priming.-The priming procedure took the form of a Scrambled Sen tence Task (e.g., Srull & Wyer, 1979; Bargh & Chartrand, 2000) . Partici pants were requested to produce sentences using words presented in a scram bled order. Two versions of this task were constructed. In the first one, primes were related to accuracy (goal-compatible priming); in the second one, primes were related to inaccuracy (goal-incompatible priming). In the priming conditions, 20 of the 30 sentences contained a word or an expres sion related to accuracy (e.g., sharpshooter, detailed, thoroughness) or inac curacy (e.g., clumsy, inaccurately, approximate). The 10 remaining sentences contained neutral words (e.g., book, soup, pen) and were used in both ver sions. In the no priming condition, participants were not given the Scram bled Sentence Task.
Motor task: the Slalom Game.-A drawing task, the "Slalom Game," was designed and administered to participants. This discrete task requires attention, coordination, visuospatial abilities, and precise band control. Par ticipants received an A4 sheet on which was printed a circle (diameter = 10 cm) composed of a dotted line (the space between each of the 72 dots was 2 mm). The instruction was to draw a continuous line from point A (start) to point B (finish) by "slaloming" between the dots. The task (size of the circle and space between the dots) had been pretested to provide a real challenge in terms of difficulty. The main dependent measure was the number of times the drawn line touched the dotted line.
Sel/-e//icacy scale.-A modified version of the General Self-efficacy scale (Schwarzer & Jerusalem, 1995) was administered. Each of the 10 original items was modified to apply to a specific domain of production of accurate movements. For each item (e.g., "I can always be accurate in my moves if I try hard enough"), participants had to indicate their choice using a Likert type scale (anchored by 1: False and 4: True). The interna! consistency of the scale was good (Cronbach alpha= .81).
Procedure
Participants were informed that they would be taking part in several unrelated tasks: a short survey (the Self-efficacy scale), a language test (the Scrambled Sentence Task), and a motor skill test (the Slalom Game). Assign ment to the priming condition (i.e, inaccuracy, no prime, or accuracy) was random. In the no prime condition, participants only filled in the Self-effi cacy scale and performed the motor task. For the Slalom Game, all partici pants received an accuracy goal. Instructions read, "On this sheet you can see a circular dotted line. With your pen, you have to draw a continuous line by slaloming between the dots, beginning at point A and finishing at point B. Y ou have to draw the line without touching the dots. Perform this task as accurately as possible." There was no time pressure, and participants were instructed to perform the Slalom Game at their own pace. After the task, participants answered manipulations check items. Finally, they were de briefed and thanked.
REsuLTS
Manipulations Check
Priming and conscious goal.-Suspicions regarding the relationship be tween the priming manipulation and the motor task were probed using a questionnaire with questions concerning what the participants thought the experiment was about and whether they thought one part or task in the ex periment might have affected another part or task ("funneled" question naire, see Bargh & Chartrand, 2000) . No participant indicated any aware ness or suspicion that the words used on the priming task were related to the subsequent task. To ensure participants had pursued the conscious accu racy goal, they were asked to recall the instructions they read before perform ing the motor task. Analysis of recalls indicated that instructions had been well understood as an accuracy goal.
Priming and selfef/icacy.-As the measure of self-efficacy took place af ter the priming manipulation, whether priming had an effect on self-efficacy score of participants was checked. The one-way analysis of variance indi cated no effect of priming on self-efficacy beliefs (F < 1.00). Mean scores of self-efficacy were not different for participants primed with inaccuracy-re-lated words (M=29.9), accuracy-related words (M=28.4), and for partici pants who received no priming (M = 27.4) .
Performance
The mean number of errors (i.e., the number of times the drawn line touched the dotted line) was entered into a 3 (priming: inaccuracy, no prime, accuracy) X 2 (self-efficacy: low vs high) between-subjects analysis of vad ance. The analysis yielded a main effect of priming on performance (F,, 6 1 = 5.96, p<.02, r{=.10). Compared with the No prime condition, the Accura cy-primed group committed less errors (i.e., performed the task more accu rately) than the Inaccuracy-primed group. The main effect of self-efficacy was also significant (F 1 ,61 = 6.38, p < .02, 11 2 = .11). As expected, participants with high self-efficacy performed better than participants with low self-effi cacy. Interaction of the factors was not significant (F < 1.00).
Planned comparisons yielded a significant difference between the high self-efficacy with accuracy-priming conditions and the low self-efficacy with inaccuracy-priming conditions (F 1 , 61 = 10.51, p < .02). Differences in perfor mance between these groups and the Control group were not significant (re spectively, F,, 61 = 2.94, ns and F 1 , 61 =2.99, ns). This study provides evidence concerning the joint influence of goal priming and self-efficacy on performance. It also provides elements about the effects of compatibility and incompatibility between a nonconsciously primed content and a consciously pursued goal on performance. Both the nonconscious primes and the conscious goal used were related to perfor mance. Goal-compatible primes tended to improve performance, whereas with goal-incompatible primes, performance tended to deteriorate.
Two explanations could account for the observed effect of priming on performance. First, in reference to literature concerning nonconscious moti vation (e.g., Chartrand & Bargh, 2002) , it is possible that goal-related primes influence the allocation of available motivational resources, promoting a fo cus of the resources on a single goal in the case of compatibility between primed content and conscious goal and, inversely, a spreading of resources in the case of goal-incompatible primes. Another plausible explanation is that goal-related primes influence the allocation of attentional resources. So, when conscious goal and primed words are compatible, priming would pro mote an attentional focus, whereas incompatibility between conscious goal and primed content would lead to divided attention. Concerning self-effi cacy, results were in line with classical findings, indicating that people with high self-efficacy perform better than people with low self-efficacy (e.g., Ban dura, 1997).
An additive effect of conscious and nonconscious self-regulation on per formance was observed. Self-efficacy and priming independently influenced performance, although the two variables did not interact. If conscious and nonconscious goal pursuits share the same characteristics and presumably rely on the same core mechanisms (Bargh, et al., 2001; Chartrand & Bargh, 2002) , self-regulatory processes such as ones associated with self-efficacy ap pear to be exclusive features of consciously pursued goals. Thus, results sug gested that goal-related priming and conscious goal pursuit may rely on complementary rather than on incompatible processes and open interesting research perspectives. On the one hand, nonconscious regulation of behavior relies on automatic processes which are rapid, have a low cost in mental re sources, and operate in parallel (Meier, Morger, & Graf, 2003) . On the other hand, conscious self-regulation of behaviors and goals that rely on lim ited resources and costs are by far higher (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000) . So, compared with conscious self-regulation, nonconscious regulation of be havior certainly saves resources that could be used in the performance of a conscious task. Nonconscious regulation of behavior through a priming ma nipulation could be a way to improve (or hinder, as a fonction of the primed content's characteristics) people's efficacy in the performance of a variety of tasks. Particularly, priming procedures could be used as a complement to in structions. Such procedures may help people to focus on their activity and, for instance, improve testimony through a better recognition or allow a bet ter target detection. One can also imagine that specific priming procedure could be used as a treatment of depression through modifying self-talk. De pressed people tend to focus on negative thought and negative self-talk, which has been proposed to limit resources for psychological changes. Goal priming could be a way to improve the use of mental resources as well as promote positive self-talk.
Results are also in line with the idea that nonconscious processes play an important role in everyday life, even in tasks requiring attention and cog nitive resources. This is the case, for instance, when important decisions have to be made (e.g., choose an apartment or a roommate; Dijksterhuis, 2004) . It also appears to be true for tasks requiring high attention, such as complex motor tasks (Légal, Meyer, & Delouvée, 2007) . So, given its charac-teristics and particularly its low cost in resources, nonconscious regulation of behavior could constitute a very adaptive way to regulate performance in a broad range of activities.
Researchers must consider the problem in greater detail. For instance, in this study, the conscious goal was a difficult "do your best" goal (one of low specificity). Locke and Latham (1990) stated in their Goal Setting The ory that this type of goal is not optimal for highest performance and work motivation, a difficult but specific goal is the best way to focus and improve goal pursuit and performance. It would also be fruitful to investigate the way in which feedback and goal specificity are influenced by the presence of nonconscious motives. Priming incompatible goal-related content could also be considered as a performance-avoidance goal (Elliot & Harackiewicz, 1994; Bell & Kozlowsli, 2002) , so aspects of goal-orientation models should be ex plored to test the underlying processes more directly.
Finally, nonconscious goal pursuit and affect-related issues also provide interesting perspectives. It has been demonstrated that positive affect, when associated to a goal, facilitates its pursuit (Custers & Aarts, 2005) , but other questions remain. For instance, does goal priming modify or create affects? Does conflict between conscious and nonconscious goals create a specific af fective state, such as a kind of cognitive dissonance? If such a state exists, what are its consequences on behavior and cognitive processes?
